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 1 
Summary 
 
One of the most internationally criticized decisions made by the European 
Union was the extension of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) in 
2008; so that it would also cover all aviation coming from and going to the 
EU. The emission trading would cover emissions discharged both outside 
and within the EU territory. The situation led to a legal battle before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning the 
compatibility between EU Law and international law especially the Chicago 
Convention and the principle of sovereignty. The Court came to the 
conclusion that the inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS did not breach 
international law. In practice the Court had, in their judgment, to choose 
between the consequences that greenhouse gas emissions have on the 
climate and the consequences that going against international agreements on 
international aviation law and trust from other contracting partners. The 
Court chooses the former and was met with strong opposition. This thesis is 
critical analysis of the EU ETS based on the questions put forward in the 
ruling of the CJEU in Case C-366/10 ATA and Others. An analysis of this 
case shows an interpretation in favor of the environment, but also 
demonstrates the difficulty with laws open for interpretation within a legal 
system, international law, where enforcing the law has proven so difficult. 
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Sammanfattning 
Ett av de mest internationellt kritiserade besluten som Europeiska unionen 
tagit var då de 2008 beslutade att inkludera alla flyg till och från EU i 
Europeiska unionens handel med utsläppsrätter (EU ETS). Med betydelsen 
att flygbolagen skulle bli tvungna att handla med utsläppsrätter inte bara 
gällande de utsläpp som skedde inom Europeiska unionens luftrum utan 
också utanför. Beslutet resulterade i att ett flertal flygbolag tog frågan till 
EU-domstolen där beslutet ifrågasattes speciellt utifrån de regler som finns i 
Chicagokonventionen och utifrån suveränitetsprincipen. Domstolen kom till 
slutsatsen att beslutet att inkludera flyget i utsläppshandeln inte stred mot 
internationell rätt, ett beslut som mött mycket starkt motstånd. För 
domstolen blev det i praktiken ett val mellan skyddet för miljön och den 
skada det kan innebära för internationell rätt och framtida samarbeten att 
uppfattas att inte följa avtal som undertecknas. Domstolen valde det förra 
och kritiken har inte väntat på sig. Syftet med denna uppsats är att kritiskt 
granska EUs beslut utifrån de frågor som ställs till EU-domstolen och 
utifrån EU-domstolens tolkningar i fall C-366/10. En genomgång av domen 
visar på tolkningsmöjligheter till fördel till miljön men också på 
svårigheterna med lagar öppna för tolkning inom ett system, den 
internationella rätten, där sanktionssystemen i praktiken är begränsade. 
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Preface 
I have always been fascinated by international law, the possibilities that 
come with it and the complicated politics that surrounds it. Another strong 
interest is environmental law. Therefore, when I read about all the politics 
and legal arguments surrounding the European Union's inclusion of 
Aviation in the EU ETS the choice of topic for my thesis was quite easy. 
Writing it in English was harder. 
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Abbreviations 
ECAC  European Civil Aviation Conference 
EEA  European Economic Area 
EU ETS   The EU emissions trading scheme 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization 
MBM  Market based measures 
Small emitters  Aircraft operators emitting less than 25,000 tCO2 
per year or operating fewer than 243 flights per 
period for three consecutive 4-month periods 
EC European Community, after 1993 the European 
Union 
EU European Union 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
Kyoto Protocol International treaty that extends the UNFCCC 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
It is now widely acknowledged that greenhouse gas emissions from human 
activities are one of the principal causes of climate change over the last 
century. Emissions trading have become the major instrument for regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions and to relieve the environmental damage caused 
by these emissions. Aviation is said to be one of the fastest growing sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions. In an attempt to reduce the emissions from the 
aviation sector the European Union decided in 2008 to extend the EU 
emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) so that it would also cover aviation. 
This implies that all airlines, passenger and cargo flights, must acquire and 
surrender allowances for the carbon emissions produced by their flights 
between EU airports and to the last leg of international flights between EU 
and non-EU airports. The latter has met strong opposition from international 
aviation organizations and non-EU countries, especially due to the number 
of legal questions it raises in different areas of international law. Examples 
of questions raised are the following: if states are permitted to regulate 
activities outside their territorial jurisdictions, and if the inclusion of 
aviation in the EU ETS is consistent with bilateral and multilateral 
agreements governing air transport, tariffs and trade?  
Against this background, the aim of this thesis is to investigate, in light of 
international law, the legality of the European Union's decision to include 
aviation in the EU ETS based on the Court's interpretations in case C-
366/10 ATA and Others and its legal and political implications. The legal 
analysis in the thesis will be restricted to international customary law and 
multilateral agreements, leaving out bilateral agreements such as the EU-US 
Open Skies Agreement. 
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1.2 Methodology and objectives 
 
The present thesis addresses the question of the legality of the EU ETS 
based on the questions put forward in the ruling of the CJEU in Case C-
366/10.  The questions in the case are the following: 
 
• EU by applying the EU ETS on flights between the EU and non-EU 
airports violates the principle of customary international law that 
each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace; 
 
• EU by applying the EU ETS on flights between the EU and non-EU 
airports violates the principle of customary international law that no 
state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its 
sovereignty; 
 
• EU by applying the EU ETS on flights between the EU and non-EU 
airports violates the principle of customary international law of 
freedom to flyover the high seas; 
 
• EU by applying the EU ETS on flights between the EU and non-EU 
airports violates the principle of customary international law that 
aircraft overflying the high seas are subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the country in which they are registered, save as 
expressly provided for by international treaty; 
 
• EU by applying the EU ETS on flights between the EU and non-EU 
airports violates the Chicago Convention (in particular Articles 1, 
11, 12, 15 and 24), and finally,  
 
• EU by applying the EU ETS on flights between the EU and non-EU 
airports violates the Kyoto Protocol (in particular, Article 2(2))?1 
 
                                                
1 Reference for preliminary ruling in Case C-366/10, question 1a-g.  
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In order to answer the questions described above a legal dogmatic method 
has been used. The primary sources are relevant international conventions 
and case law in relation to this legislation. Case law analysis plays an 
important role in understanding the legislation that affects the EU ETS since 
some of the provisions are vague and open to interpretation. In parts where 
the case law is limited, relevant scholarly writings are also used to interpret 
current legislation. 
 
1.3 Structure 
 
The thesis is organized into four chapters: 
 
The first chapter gives an introduction to the subject of the thesis, the 
methodology used, the objectives and the structure of the thesis.  
 
Chapter two provides a background to the questions raised and is divided 
into four sections. The first section provides the history and background of 
the EU ETS. The subsequent sections deal with the EU ETS in particular 
and the international opposition it has met. The fourth section describes, in 
short, the relationship between EU-law and international law, primarily 
focusing on those functions that directly affect the case on which this thesis 
is based.  
 
The third chapter presents the legal aspects of the EU ETS. This chapter is 
divided into seven sections. The first section presents briefly the ruling of 
the CJEU in Case C-366/10 ATA and Others. The legal questions addressed 
in Case C-366/10 then forms the base for the following sections of the 
chapter where the relationship between the EU ETS and international law is 
examined.  For educational reasons and because of the range of legal 
questions present in Case C-366/10 the different sections are concluded with 
shorter legal analyses and personal comments regarding that sections 
specific topic.  
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The fourth and the final chapter will summarize the findings of the thesis 
and on the basis of the findings provide a few comments.  
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2 EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING 
SCHEME 
 
2.1 History and Background 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), of which the EU’s aviation 
scheme is a part, is a large-scale greenhouse gas emissions trading program. 
The scheme works as European Union's key tool for reducing industrial 
greenhouse gas emissions. The EU ETS is at present operating in all the EU 
countries and the three EEA-EFTA States such as Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway covering about 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions.2 
The origin of the EU ETS dates back to 1992 and the signing of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty 
aimed to, according to its second article, stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Following negotiations 
under the UNFCCC, the European Community (EC) and the initial 15 EU 
Member States signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, committing the EC and 
EU Member States to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. To enable the 
EU to meet its Kyoto targets the EU-ETS was enacted.3 The EU ETS first 
directive  - Directive 2003/87/EC, entered into force on 13 October 2003 
after being adopted unanimously by the Council of Ministers along with a 
large majority of Parliament.  
In November 2008, the European Parliament and the Council adopted 
Directive 2008/10/EC, which amended Directive 2003/87/EC to include 
aviation in the EU ETS. This was a result of the increasing concern over the 
growing emissions from aviation. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
country in Europe with the highest level of CO2 emissions from aviation 
according to UNFCCC National inventory on submissions, greenhouse gas 
                                                
2European Comission Climate Action, 2013. 
3 Pohlmann, 2010, s. 336f. 
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emissions from aviation has more than doubled since 1990. Furthermore, 
whilst emissions from other sectors are predicted to decrease till 2050 
emissions from aviation will increase contributing to, in the case of United 
Kingdom, 15% of the total UK emissions in 2020 and 29% in 2050.4 The 
European Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, expressed 
the following in a press release in March 2011:  
Emissions from aviation are growing faster than from any 
other sector, and all forecasts indicate they will continue to do 
so under business as usual conditions. Firm action is needed. 5 
The EU’s decision to include aviation in the EU ETS, as will be further 
discussed under sections 2.2 and 2.3, met strong opposition from 
international aviation organizations and non-EU countries. This opposition 
resulting in the EU in 2012, as a ”goodwill gesture”, suspending EU ETS 
and aviation emissions for one year to allow time for agreement on a global 
framework for tackling aviation emissions to be reached by International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2013. During the ICAO Assembly's 
38th Session a resolution was adopted on October 4 in 2013 where ICAO’s 
Member States agreed on developing and applying a single global market-
based measure (MBM) to international aviation emissions. The measures 
will be presented and voted for by ICAO during their 39th Session in 2016 
and implemented in 2020.6  As a result the EU has decided, via Regulation 
(EU) No 421/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014, to momentarily exempt flights to and from third countries to 
facilitate progress at the upcoming ICAO meeting.7 The European 
Commission is of the opinion that a global approach to addressing the 
rapidly growing emissions from aviation would be the preferred way 
bearing in mind that aviation is of strong international character.8 
                                                
4Elena Ares 2012. 
5European Commission - IP/11/259  07/03/2011. 
6 ICAO A38-WP/430. 
7 Council Regulation No 421/2014. 
8 Commission Decision No 377/2013/EU. 
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2.2 EU's Emissions Trading Scheme 
The EU ETS, regulated by Directive 2003/87/EC, works on the "cap and 
trade" principle. This implies that a cap or limit is set on the total amount of 
certain greenhouse gases that can be emitted by the factories, power plants, 
commercial airlines and other installations in the scheme. The cap is 
reduced over time so that total emissions fall. 
Within the cap, companies receive or buy emission allowances that they can 
trade with one another as needed. Companies can also buy limited amounts 
of international credits from emission-saving projects around the world.  
After each year the company must surrender a number of allowances equal 
to the total amount of emissions from the company that year, each 
allowance representing one ton of carbon dioxide. If not followed, fines are 
imposed according to article 16 of the Directive 2003/87/EG and the names 
of the operators and companies who are not in compliance will be 
publicized.  
Potentially emissions trading have the capacity to cover many different 
economic sectors and greenhouse gases, but within EU ETS the sectors and 
greenhouse gases included have been limited to emissions which easily and 
with a high level of accuracy can be measured, reported and verified.9 This 
means that the scheme today covers emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
from power plants, a wide range of energy-intensive industry sectors and 
commercial airlines, nitrous oxide emissions from the production of certain 
acids and emissions of perfluorocarbons from aluminum production.10 
Participation in the EU ETS is mandatory for companies operating in these 
sectors, but in some sectors only plants above a certain size are included. 
Governments can exclude certain small installations from the scheme if 
fiscal or other measures are in place that will cut their emissions by an 
equivalent amount. 
                                                
9 European Commission, The EU Emissions Trading System, p. 3. 
10 See article 1 of Directive 2003/87/EG and its Annexes.  
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The EU ETS is divided into a number of phases or trading periods. The first 
period ran between 2005 and 2007, the second from 2008 to 2012 
(coinciding with the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period.) and the 
third period started 2013 and runs until 2020.  
For commercial airlines, the scheme covers CO2 emissions from flights 
within and between the states participating in the EU ETS. International 
flights to and from non-ETS states are also covered, but as a ”goodwill 
gesture” the European Commission has decided to defer the scheme's 
application to allow time for agreement on a global framework for tackling 
aviation emissions until autumn 2016. This is further discussed under 
section 2.1.  
2.3 International Critique 
There has been significant international opposition to the inclusion of 
aviation in the EU ETS. The opposition has come from within the ICAO as 
well as from individual countries and the airline industry.  
In November 2011 the ICAO Council endorsed a working paper, presented 
by 26 ICAO Member States, which stated that the unilateral action by the 
EU and its Member States undermines the role of ICAO in addressing 
aviation emissions and they urged the EU and its Member States to refrain 
from including flights by non-EU carriers to/ from airports in the EU in its 
emissions trading scheme.11 
The airline industry reacted strongly and opted for a litigation strategy, with 
the result that a consortium of US airlines, supported by the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA), and the National Airlines Council of 
Canada took the dispute directly to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU).  The Court dismissed the action brought by the airline 
industry holding that the EU ETS is consistent with international law. In the 
context of the failed litigation approach by the airline industry 23 states 
                                                
11 ICAO, Working Paper Subject No. 50, paragraph 3.3 and appendix A2 paragraph 6.   
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decided in February 2012 to adopt the Moscow Declaration denouncing the 
EU ETS. Threatening with different forms of retribution if not followed, 
including litigation under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, the 
prohibition of domestic airlines and operators from participating in the EU 
ETS, mandating EU carriers to submit flight details and imposing additional 
charges on EU carriers and aircraft operators and reviewing air transport 
service agreements such as the Open Skies agreement.12 
On an individual state level the including of aviation in the EU ETS 
provoked strong opposition, especially from China, Russia, India and the 
United States. Moreover, both India and China prohibit their national 
carriers from complying with the EU-ETS13 and China blocked an order of 
A380 planes from Airbus worth almost US$4 billion.14 The United States 
also threatened to take measures, warning the EU that if they follow the 
CJEU’s decision in the ATA Case the United States would be compelled to 
take appropriate action.15 
 
2.4 International Law and the European Union 
 
To understand the relationship between international law, EU law and the 
decisions of the CJEU it is important to place the EU in a legal context.  
The legislative systems within the EU are extremely complex which has 
been described by some scholars as incomprehensible.16 Considering the 
complexity of the EU legislation and EU constitutional law and the limits of 
this thesis this section makes no attempt to fully describe the relation 
between international law and European law, it provides only a backdrop to 
                                                
12 Joint Declaration of the Moscow meeting on inclusion of international Civil aviation in 
the EU ETS, Attachment A paragraph 1-9.  
13 Kotoky, Anurag. India joins China in boycott of EU carbon scheme. Reuters. March 22, 
2012.  
14Leung, Alison and Yan, Fang. China-backed HK Airlines may dump A380 order. Reuters. 
March 1, 2012. 
15 Krukowska, Ewa. EU Tells Clinton It Won’t Abandon Carbon Limits for Airlines. 
Bloomberg Business. January 17, 2012. 
16 Douglas-Scott 2002 p. 110. 
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the further sections. Therefore the focus is primarily on those functions that 
directly affect the case on which this thesis is based.  
The EU is, in somewhat simplified terms, a federation of nation states. The 
EU’s primary object is to regulate the relationship among its Member 
States, and has excelled in doing so. Compared to other international 
organizations the effectiveness of the EU's actions is far greater within the 
legal systems of the Member States than within any other organizations.17 
The power of the EU acts is also clearly stated by the CJEU in Case C-6/64 
Costa v. ENEL: 
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC 
Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry of 
the force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal 
systems of the Member States and which their courts are 
bound to apply.18 
 
EU law is divided into primary legislation (treaties), secondary legislation 
(regulations, directives and decisions) and supplementary legislation (case 
law, international law and general principles of law).  
 
It is the task of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to 
determine the legality of the EU law. One of the actions that may be brought 
before the CJEU is the action of annulment of a EU act based on its legality. 
This possibility is regulated in the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and more specifically in Article 263 of the TFEU. 
There are, according to Article 263, several possible plaintiffs among them 
Member States, the European Parliament and individuals.   
 
The CJEU is assisted by the office of the Advocate General whose task is to 
give an opinion of the case before the CJEU on how the Court should rule. 
The opinion is not binding, but strongly influential and followed by the 
                                                
17 Wouters, 2002, p. 6ff. 
18 Case C-6/64, p. 593. 
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CJEU in most cases.19 The opinions are usually more detailed and easier to 
follow than the judgments of the CJEU. The opinions, when followed, form 
an important legal source.  
 
The initial goal of the EU was to regulate the internal market but the EU has 
with time grown into one of the most important actors when it comes to 
questions concerning international law. One of the reasons is the EU’s role 
as a major world power due to its nature as a Customs Union and 
international trade partner. The EU treaties do not explicitly contain rules 
about the status of international law within the EU law but the CJEU has 
developed extensive case law concerning international agreements and 
international customary law. In the case of the CJEU the court has for many 
years in practice used international customary law to interpret EU law in 
conformity with customary law20 and in the Poulsen Case C-286/90, CJEU 
explicitly states that European Community must respect international law 
when exercising its powers.21 
 
 
 
 
                                                
19Craig 2008 s. 70. 
20 Wouters, 2002, s. 6ff. 
21 Case C-286/90, para 9. 
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3 Legality of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
3.1 Air Transport Association V. SS for Energy and Climate 
Change C-366/10 
As already mentioned in the Introduction the question of the legality of the 
EU-ETS is, in this thesis, based on the questions addressed in the ruling of 
the CJEU C-366/10 Air Transport Association v. SS for Energy and Climate 
Change.  
In Case C-366/10 several US and Canadian airlines and airline associations 
challenged the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC. From the airline industry 
perspective the Directive violates principles of customary international law 
and the provisions of the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Open Skies Agreement. The main legal arguments for the airline industry 
are that the EU breaches obligations according to Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on climate Change 
(hereinafter ”Kyoto Protocol”) by not working through ICAO, that the EU 
breaches international customary law by applying EU ETS to ”parts of 
flights which take place outside the airspace of EU Member States”22 and by 
imposing illegal charges to aircraft operators and thereby breaching Article 
15 of the Chicago Convention. The CJEU found that the EU-ETS does not 
infringe principles of customary international law or any of the other 
obligations mentioned in the case.  
Briefly, CJEU's interpretations will be discussed in depth in the following 
sections. The CJEU found that only the Open Skies Agreement and three 
principles of customary international law, namely sovereignty of the States 
over their airspace, the unlawfulness of claims of sovereignty over the high 
seas and freedom to fly over the high seas were applicable for the purpose 
of examining the validity of the Directive. The CJEU came to the 
                                                
22 Case C-366/10, , para 38. 
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conclusion that the EU was not bound by the Chicago Convention, since the 
EU is not a party to the convention. Concerning the obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol the CJEU found that the Protocol is conditional and not 
sufficiently precise to be used.    
Concerning the three principles of customary international law the CJEU 
considers that the EU was competent to adopt Directive 2008/101/EC 
because it only applies to flights arriving in or departing from the EU. It is 
first when the carrier arrives at an aerodrome situated within the EU that it 
becomes subject to the jurisdiction of that Member State and the EU. In 
other words the Directive, according to the CJEU, does not breach the 
principle of territoriality or the sovereignty which third States have over the 
airspace above their territory. A carrier flying over the high seas, are not, per 
se, a subject to the EU ETS and in that sense the EU ETS does not infringe 
the principle of freedom to fly over the high seas. That is to say that only the 
aircraft operator who has chosen to operate a commercial air route arriving 
at or departing from an aerodrome situated in the EU will be subject to the 
scheme.23 
When it comes to the Open Skies Agreement the claim was that the 
Directive breaches the articles in the agreement that exempts fuel loads from 
taxes, duties, fees and charges and that prohibit measures limiting the 
volume of traffic and frequency of service. Something that was rejected by 
the CJEU on the basis that the EU ETS is a market-based measure and not a 
tax, duty, fee or charge imposed on the fuel load and that the EU ETS sets 
no limit on the emissions of the aircraft which arrive at or depart from an 
aerodrome in the EU, in other words the EU ETS does not, according to the 
CJEU, limit the frequency or regularity of the service as such.24 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Case C-366/10, para 127. 
24 Ibid, para 153. 
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3.2 EU ETS and the Chicago Convention 
 
3.2.1 Background 
Regarding the EU ETS and the Chicago Convention, the United Kingdom 
High Court of Justice referred the following questions to the CJEU in Case 
C-366/10: 
 
• Is Chicago Convention (in particular Articles 1, 11, 12, 15 and 24) 
capable of being relied upon in this case to challenge the validity of 
Directive 2003/87/EC as amended by Directive 2008/101/EC so as 
to include aviation activities within the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme?25 
 
• Is the Amended Directive contravening Articles 1, 11 and/or 12 of 
the Chicago Convention if and insofar as it applies the Emissions 
Trading Scheme to those parts of flights (either generally or by 
aircraft registered in third countries) which take place outside the 
airspace of EU Member States?26 
 
• Is the Amended Directive invalid insofar as it applies the Emissions 
Trading Scheme to aviation activities contravening Article 15 or 24 
of the Chicago Convention?27 
 
3.2.2 The Chicago Convention 
 
The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation from 1944 forms 
the basis of aviation law and is also the reason for the formation of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a UN agency with 
currently191 Member States, including all EU Member States. In Case C-
                                                
25 Application Case C-366/10, question 1e. 
26 Ibid, question 3a. 
27 Ibid, questions 4b and c. 
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366/10 five articles of the Chicago Convention are of special interest when 
it comes to the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS and these are articles 1, 
11, 12, 15 and 24.  
 
Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, Sovereignty 
Article 1 of the Chicago Convention is the codification of international 
customary law principle of sovereignty and states that the contracting States 
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory.  
 
Article 11 of the Chicago Convention, Applicability of air regulations 
Article 11 of the Chicago Convention is a non-discrimination clause, 
requiring that all aircraft be awarded the same regulatory treatment 
regardless of whether they are domestic or foreign.  
 
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, Rules of the air 
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention requests that Member States should 
ensure that airline operators respect national rules and regulations and that 
each contracting State undertakes to keep its own regulations in these 
respects uniform, to the greatest possible extent. Article 12 also states, 
somewhat contradictory, that over the high seas, where it is recognized that 
no state has sovereignty, the rules established under the Chicago Convention 
should be in force.  
 
Articles 15 and 24 of the Chicago Convention 
Both article 15 and 24 of the Chicago Convention concerns restrictions on 
charges and customs duties.  
 
3.2.3 The Opinion of the Advocate General 
 
The Advocate General finds that the EU is not bound by the Chicago 
Convention and the Convention can therefore not be relied upon as a 
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benchmark against which the validity of acts of EU institutions can be 
reviewed.  
 
To come to the above conclusion the Advocate General looks at two 
conditions proposed by the claimants that would make the EU bound by the 
convention without being a Contracting Party. These are: 
• that the European Union is substantively bound by the Chicago 
Convention based on Article 351 of the TFEU, and 
• that the European Union is substantively bound by the Chicago 
Convention based on the theory of functional succession. 
Article 351 of the TFEU stipulates that the EU cannot impose regulations 
that restrain Member States from fulfilling obligations originating from 
agreements prior to the existence of the European Union. Taking into 
account the pacta sunt servanda principle of international law. The Advocate 
General dismisses that Article 351 of the TFEU would have the implied 
effect, instead arguing that Article 351 of the TFEU is intended to stop the 
EU from preventing individual Member States from fulfilling obligation 
made prior to the formation of the EU. However, according to the Advocate 
General, the EU institutions duty not to impede the Member States 
obligations does not mean that the EU itself has entered into any 
international law commitments towards third states.28 
 
The claimants opposed to the above interpretation by the Advocate General 
based on the functional succession principle, referring to the joined Cases 
21/72 to 24/72 International Fruit Company and others where the CJEU 
ruled that: 
 
…in so far as the then European Economic Community had 
under the EEC Treaty assumed the powers previously 
exercised by Member States in the area governed by the 1947 
                                                
28 Opinion of AG Kokott, Case C-366/10, para 57. 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
provisions of that agreement had the effect of binding the 
Community even without it formally becoming a Party to that 
agreement.29 
 
The Advocate General dismisses the relevance of this ruling arguing that the 
EU Members have not delegated to the EU all of the powers in the air 
transport sector. The Advocate General gives the example of air transport 
agreements that until recently has been mixed agreements to which both the 
EU and its Member States have been contracting parties.30 The Advocate 
General further argues that the EU has not formally taken place in the ICAO 
as it did in the GATT.31 The Advocate Generals arguments is, in this part, 
based on the Intertanko Case - C-308/06 where the CJEU limited the 
functional succession principle that was identified in the International Fruit 
Company case by allowing for succession into Member States obligations 
only in case of “a full transfer of the powers previously exercised by the 
Member States to the Community”. 32 A limitation that has met strong 
criticism due to the fact that it in practice rule out succession into 
international obligations of the Member States.33 
Even though the Advocate General come to the conclusion that the EU is 
not bound by the Chicago Convention the Advocate General still stresses 
that since all the Member States of the European Union are Parties to the 
Chicago Convention the convention therefore must be taken into account 
when interpreting the provisions of secondary EU law.34 However, even 
then, the Advocate General does not find that the inclusion of aviation in the 
EU ETS is in conflict with the obligations under the Chicago Convention. 
Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, Sovereignty 
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The principle of Air Sovereignty in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention 
was addressed by the Advocate General, after coming to the conclusion that 
the EU is not bound by the Chicago Convention, in the Advocate General's 
discussion of jurisdictional implications of customary international law. The 
view of the Advocate General concerning this principle will therefore be 
discussed further under section 3.4.3. 
 
Article 11 of the Chicago Convention, Applicability of air regulations 
The Advocate General dismisses the claim that Article 11 of the Chicago 
Convention would be in conflict with the inclusion of Aviation in the EU 
ETS. The Advocate General argues that as an anti-discrimination clause the 
only substantive requirement laid down by Article 11is that laws and 
regulations of Contracting States cannot be discriminatory on the grounds of 
nationality. The EU ETS includes all airlines, no matter nationality, and 
therefore it does not violate the prohibition of discrimination. The Advocate 
General states: 
The only substantive requirement laid down by Article 11 of 
the Chicago Convention in relation to the laws and regulations 
of Contracting States concerning the admission, departure and 
operation of aircraft is the prohibition of discrimination against 
aircraft on grounds of their nationality: the laws and 
regulations concerned are to ‘be applied to the aircraft of all 
contracting States without distinction as to nationality’. None 
of the parties involved in the present case has cast any doubt 
on the fact that the EU emissions trading scheme satisfies that 
requirement.35 
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, Rules of the air 
The Advocate General dismisses that there are any such rules to be found in 
the Directive that is forbidden according to Article 12 of the Chicago 
Convention. The Advocate General argues that the EU emissions trading 
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scheme does not require airlines to adhere to any particular flight paths, 
specific speed limits, or limits on fuel consumption.36 
 
Articles 15 and 24 of the Chicago Convention 
Articles 15 and 24 of the Chicago Convention were partly addressed by the 
Advocate General under questions concerning The Open Skies Agreement. 
This due to the referral in Article 3(4) of the Open Skies Agreement to 
Article 15 of the Chicago Convention and the correspondence between 
Article 11(2)(c) of the Open Skies Agreement and Article 24(a) of the 
Chicago Convention.  
Article 15 of the Chicago Convention states that no fees, dues or other 
charges are to be imposed by any Contracting State in respect solely of the 
right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a 
Contracting State or persons or property thereon. The Advocate General 
dismisses that EU emissions trading scheme would introduce such fees on 
entry or exit that would be in conflict with Article 15 of the Chicago 
Convention.  
The Advocate General argues that the prohibition in Article 15 cannot be 
read in isolation from the overall context. It is apparent that the overall aim 
of the provision is to: 
…afford all aircraft access to airports in Contracting States 
which are open to public use ‘under uniform conditions’ 
irrespective of their nationality.37 
The meaning of Article 15 is that - 
 …charges for the use of airports and air navigation facilities 
by the aircraft of other Contracting States are not to be higher 
than those that would be paid by national aircraft.38 
                                                
36 Ibid, para 169. 
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Advocate General further states that-  
Article 15 is construed as a whole as the mere expression of a 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, there 
can be no reservations with regard to the compatibility with 
that provision of the EU emissions trading scheme, because 
that scheme applies in the same way to all aircraft irrespective 
of their nationality.39 
The Advocate General examines the compatibility of Article 24 of the 
Chicago Convention and the Directive together with the corresponding 
Article 11 (2) (c) of the Open Skies Agreement. Both articles provide that 
fuel on board an aircraft is to be exempt from customs duties or similar 
duties and charges. The Advocate General then dismisses that there would 
be any conflict between prohibition of charging customs and excise duties 
on fuel for aircraft engaged in international air transportation and the 
inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS. Arguing that EU ETS cannot be 
considered a tax or a charge due to the fact that the EU ETS objective is 
environmental and climate protection and it is not related to the import and 
export of goods to which taxes and charges aim. The emission allowances 
that have to be surrendered in respect of flights that take off from or land at 
aerodromes within the EU are levied in respect of the emission of 
greenhouse gases, not fuel consumption.40 The Advocate General further 
argues that the substance of the provisions in Article 24(a) of the Chicago 
Convention relate to the quantity of fuel on board an aircraft or supplied to 
such aircraft while the EU ETS is based on the quantity of fuel actually used 
by the aircraft during a specific flight.41 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, para 212. 
40 Ibid, para 229. 
42 Case C-366/10, para 71. 
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3.2.4 The CJEU Judgment 
In their ruling the CJEU followed the reasoning of Advocate General, only 
making a few concessions, which did not affect the overall judgment. In 
conformity with the Advocate General CJEU states that while all EU 
Member States are contracting parties to the convention, the EU is not. In 
line with the Advocate General, the CJEU concludes that Article 351 TFEU, 
described in further detail under section 3.3.3, does not bind the EU to the 
Chicago Convention due to the fact that EU does not have exclusive 
competence. The CJEU states: 
… it must be concluded that, since the powers previously 
exercised by the Member States in the field of application of 
the Chicago Convention have not to date been assumed in their 
entirety by the European Union, the latter is not bound by that 
convention.42 
Unlike the Advocate General the CJEU does take into consideration or 
mention that the Chicago Convention should/could be taken into account 
when interpreting the provisions of secondary EU law based on the fact that 
all Member States are parties to the convention. 
3.2.5 Legal Analysis and Comments 
 
Pacta sunt servanda or  "agreements must be kept" is the most basic 
principle of international law that can only be challenged by the peremptory 
norms. When it comes to the field of aviation the Chicago Convention is, as 
earlier mentioned, the basis of international aviation law and has been 
signed by all of the EU's Member States. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the dismissal of the Chicago Convention by the CJEU has met with strong 
opposition. Because what the court actually is saying is that countries can 
escape their obligations under international conventions by forming a body 
acting on those countries behalf. Had the Member States themselves 
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introduced emissions trading they would have had to do so in conformity 
with the ICAO and the Chicago Convention, but now since the EU does not 
have the competence in the entire field of air transport, it is possible for the 
Member States to escape their obligations. Does this mean that the whole 
Chicago Convention could fall as long as one competence within the 
convention is still decided by the Member states themselves? And if the 
ICAO does not bind the EU is then the ICAO not bound or affected by the 
interpretations of the Chicago Convention by the CJEU? After all the 
Advocate General comes to the conclusion that even if the Chicago 
Convention bound the EU the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS would be 
legitimate. Disputes concerning the Chicago Convention could, for example, 
also be brought before the Council of ICAO, even though the CJEU have 
stated that CJEU alone has the competence to determine if a EU act is 
invalid,43  and what would their interpretation be? In this part the decision 
seem to raise more questions than it answers and only time will tell how this 
will affect future relations within aviation. 
3.3 EU ETS and International Customary Law 
3.3.1 Background 
 
Based on the claims by the consortium of US airlines, the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), and the National Airlines Council of 
Canada, the United Kingdom High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division 
referred the following questions, regarding international customary law, to 
the CJEU in Case C-366/10: 
 
• If the principle of customary international law that each state has 
complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace can be relied 
upon in this case to challenge the validity of Directive 2003/87/EC 
as amended by Directive 2008/101/EC?44 
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• If the principle of customary international law that no state may 
validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty 
can be relied upon in this case to challenge the validity of Directive 
2003/87/EC as amended by Directive 2008/101/EC?45 
 
• If the principle of customary international law of freedom to fly over 
the high seas can be relied upon in this case to challenge the validity 
of Directive 2003/87/EC as amended by Directive 2008/101/EC?46 
 
• If the principle of customary international law that aircraft 
overflying the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the country in which they are registered, save as expressly provided 
for by international treaty can be relied upon in this case to challenge 
the validity of Directive 2003/87/EC as amended by Directive 
2008/101/EC?47 
 
If the customary international law principles were seen as applicable by the 
CJEU the Court further asked if the amended Directive is invalid, if and 
insofar as it applies the Emissions Trading Scheme to those parts of flights 
(either generally or by aircraft registered in third countries) which take place 
outside the airspace of EU Member States, as contravening one or more of 
the principles of customary international law asserted earlier by the Court?48 
 
3.3.2 The Principle of Air Sovereignty and the Principle of Freedom of 
the High Seas 
 
One of the most criticized aspects of the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS 
is the possible breach of the principle of sovereignty. A principle that 
declares that each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its 
airspace and that derives from the international customary law principle of 
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States sovereignty over their territories. This principle was first constituted 
in 1919 in Article 1 of the Paris Convention and is now codified in Article 1 
of the Chicago Convention. The principle is generally viewed as one of the 
most important principles of international law and recognizes that every 
State has complete and exclusive authority over their territory.49 
 
Areas in the absence of any State’s sovereignty for example the high seas 
(i.e. waters outside the national jurisdiction) are regulated by the principle of 
freedom of the high seas. A principle that refers to the right of every State to 
navigate, fish, lay cables etc. in the high seas. The principle also extends to 
the air space, which legally assimilates to the legal status of the areas 
underneath. The principle is today codified in, for example, the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea under Article 87 (1), where the 
right to fly freely over the high seas also is clearly stated.  
 
3.3.3 The Opinion of the Advocate General  
 
As described in chapter 3.3 the Advocate General came to the conclusion 
that the Chicago Convention did not bind the European Union, not being a 
Contracting Party to the Chicago Convention. The principle of air 
sovereignty is codified in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, but this in 
itself does not mean that the European Union is not bound by the customary 
international law principle of sovereignty of states even though the 
European Union is not a Contracting Party to the Chicago Convention. This 
being based on the principle that customary international law exists parallel 
to the international agreements in which the customary international 
principles are codified.50 Based on this the Advocate General came to the 
conclusion that principle of air sovereignty can be relied upon to challenge 
the validity of Directive. Leading to the second question if the inclusion of 
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Aviation in the EU ETS violates the principle of air sovereignty and 
freedom of the high seas.51 
 
To answer the question if the inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS violates 
the principle of air sovereignty and freedom of the high seas the Advocate 
General examines the effects of the directive in three steps.52 In this section 
these three steps will be examined based on the following three questions: Is 
the inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS an extraterritorial measure? Is there 
an adequate territorial link? Is there an adverse effect on the sovereignty of 
third countries? 
 
Is the inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS an extraterritorial measure? 
The Advocate General dismisses the claim that the inclusion of aviation in 
the EU ETS is an extraterritorial measure. Even if the calculation of 
emission allowances to be surrendered is based on the whole flight, the 
Advocate General argues, it cannot be seen as a breach of the principle of 
air sovereignty because the Directive is concerned solely with aircraft 
arrivals at and departures from aerodromes in the EU.  Even if, as Advocate 
General continues, the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS might indirectly 
give airlines an incentive to conduct themselves in a particular manner when 
flying over the territory of third countries, in particular to consume as little 
fuel as possible and expel as few greenhouse gases as possible there is no 
concrete rule regarding the airlines conduct within airspace outside the 
EU.53 The Advocate General states: 
 
The fact that the calculation of emission allowances to be 
surrendered is based on the whole flight in each case does not 
bestow upon Directive 2008/101 any extraterritorial effect. 
Admittedly, it is undoubtedly true that, to some extent, account 
is thus taken of events that take place over the high seas or on 
the territory of third countries. This might indirectly give 
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airlines an incentive to conduct themselves in a particular way 
when flying over the high seas or on the territory of third 
countries, in particular to consume as little fuel as possible and 
expel as few greenhouse gases as possible. However, there is 
no concrete rule regarding their conduct within airspace 
outside the European Union.54 
From the perspective of the Advocate General a concrete rule would have 
been, for example, the obligation on airlines to fly their aircraft on certain 
routes, to observe specific speed limits or to comply with certain limits on 
fuel consumption, neither of which is the case concerning the inclusion of 
aviation in the EU ETS. 
 
The Advocate General then draws a comparison between Aviation in the EU 
ETS and the principle of worldwide income tax that applies under the 
income tax laws in many countries and different antitrust laws. The 
Advocate General writes: 
 
Under antitrust law as well as in merger control it is normal 
worldwide practice for competition authorities to take action 
against agreements between undertakings even if those 
agreements have been concluded outside the territorial scope 
of their jurisdiction and may perhaps even have a substantial 
effect outside that scope of jurisdiction.55 
 
Is there an adequate territorial link? 
After coming to the conclusion that the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS 
has no extraterritorial effects the Advocate General argues that there is an 
adequate territorial link between emissions over the high seas and third 
countries and the EU and therefore the EU has jurisdiction over the whole 
flight if the plane comes to or leaves an airport within the EU. The Advocate 
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General argues that the EU may require all operators that provide services 
within its territory to submit to the standards set by EU-law. In accordance 
with this the EU can require airlines to submit to EU-law, in this case the 
EU ETS, whenever a plane takes off from or land at an aerodrome within 
the EU.56 If the place of departure or destination is within the EU, there will 
be, argues the Advocate General, an adequate territorial link for the flight in 
question to be included in the EU emissions trading scheme.57 The 
Advocate General continues that because of the effects that emissions from 
aviation have on the EU territory the Aviation Directive is consistent with 
the territoriality principle. Further arguing that taking the whole length of 
the flight into account is an expression of the principle of proportionality 
and reflects the ‘polluter pays’ principle of environmental law.58 Here 
referring to the environmental policy principle, which requires that the 
expenses of pollution be covered by those who cause it. The Advocate 
General States:  
 
 It is well known that air pollution knows no boundaries and 
that greenhouse gases contribute towards climate change 
worldwide irrespective of where they are emitted; they can 
have effects on the environment and climate in every State and 
association of States, including the European Union.59 
 
A parallel is then drawn by the Advocate General between Aviation in the 
EU ETS and established practice formed by CJEU that it is permissible for 
the EU to confiscate fish caught in the high seas from a vessel sailing under 
the flag of a third country whilst at a port within the EU. The Advocate 
general writes:  
 
A comparison with the aforementioned fisheries case is also 
worthwhile in this context. If it is permissible under the 
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territoriality principle for fish caught outside the European 
Union to be confiscated from a vessel sailing under the flag of 
a third country whilst at a port within the European 
Union, there cannot be any prohibition against exhaust gases 
from an aircraft emitted outside the airspace of the European 
Union being taken into account on its departure from or arrival 
at an aerodrome within the European Union for the purposes 
of calculating the emission allowances to be surrendered.60 
 
The Advocate General is here referring to the Poulsen Case C-286/90 where 
a vessel flying the Panamanian flag had caught large amounts of salmon on 
the high seas. Due to problems with the engine and adverse weather 
conditions the vessel had to head for a Danish port. Criminal charges were 
then brought against the owner of the ship, a company under Panamanian 
law, for having salmon on board in breach of community regulation 
concerning the right to fish in certain areas of the high seas. CJEU came to 
the conclusion that EU legislation concerning fish caught outside the 
jurisdiction of the EU may not be applied to vessels on the high seas 
registered in a non-member country.61The court also held that the provisions 
could not be applied to a vessel sailing or on passage through the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of a Member State or crossing the territorial waters of a 
Member State in so far as the vessel is exercising the right of innocent 
passage and freedom of navigation in those areas. But that the community 
legislation can be applied to a vessel in the inland waters or in a port of a 
member state where the vessel generally, according to the CJEU, is subject 
to the unlimited jurisdiction of the Member State.62 
 
Is there an adverse effect on the sovereignty of third countries? 
The Advocate General argues that the inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS 
has no adverse effect on the sovereignty of third countries, defining 
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sovereignty as the right of third countries to make decisions. The Advocate 
General States: 
 
Contrary to the view taken by the claimants in the main 
proceedings and the associations supporting them, Directive 
2008/101 does not, either in law or in fact, preclude third 
countries from bringing into effect or applying their own 
emissions trading schemes for aviation activities.63 
 
The Advocate General then notes the risk of double regulation, for example 
the risk of one and the same route being taken into account twice under the 
emissions trading schemes of two different States were both, like the EU 
ETS, take account of the whole flight.64 The Advocate General finds this 
risk unproblematic though as there is no prohibition against double 
regulations within international customary law and makes a comparison 
with double taxation that is regularly present.65 The Advocate General 
further argues that the risk of double inclusion of a single flight in two 
different emissions trading schemes can easiest be solved by unilateral 
measures or by agreement between the States and international 
organizations concerned.66  
 
3.3.4The CJEU Judgment 
 
The CJEU shared the Advocate General's opinion that customary 
international law principles can be relied upon to challenge the validity of 
the Directive. CJEU then, in line with the Advocate General, found that the 
inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS is not an extraterritorial measure, that 
there is an adequate territorial link and that there is no adverse effect on the 
sovereignty of third countries.67 
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3.3.5 Legal Analysis and Comments 
 
The principle of sovereignty is a founding pillar of international law. The 
possible breach of this principle is, as earlier described, the most criticized 
aspects of the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS. There are limits to state 
sovereignty and legislation with extraterritorial effects is not uncommon 
within international law. Take for example the Poulsen case, earlier 
described under section 3.4.3, that claims that fishing techniques and quotas 
for fishing must be respected no matter under which flag the vessel flies if 
the vessel plans to sell its catch in certain countries, or criminal law where 
States regularly apply domestic criminal law on certain crimes committed 
by nationals abroad. Another example of legislation with extraterritorial 
effect that has been in focus lately, but that has not met the same resistance 
from third countries as the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS, is the 
Schengen Convention that requires action outside the Schengen area by 
demanding that carriers  
 
 take all the necessary measures to ensure that an alien carried 
by air or sea is in possession of the travel documents required 
for entry into the territories of the Contracting Parties.68 
 
Extraterritorial legislation not per se being illegal forces the Advocate 
General to frame the extraterritorial effects more precisely by examining the 
legislation based on the three following requirements, is the inclusion an 
extraterritorial measure? Is there an adequate territorial link? Is there an 
adverse effect on the sovereignty of third countries?  
 
Regarding the first requirement, if the inclusion is an extraterritorial 
measure, the Advocate General claims that there is no concrete rule 
regarding the conduct of third countries in their airspace or over the high 
seas and therefore dismisses the claim that the inclusion of aviation in the 
EU ETS is an extraterritorial provision. It can here be questioned if 
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regulations concerning emissions allowances are not to be seen as concrete 
rules? Generally the Advocate General and the CJEU seem to, in this part, 
try to fit the EU ETS within the context of international law, not fully 
succeeding, because after all, and as described by the Advocate General, it 
is undoubtedly true that account is taken of events that take place over the 
high seas or on the territory of third countries. This might indirectly give 
airlines an incentive to conduct themselves in a particular way when flying 
over the high seas or on the territory of third countries, in particular to 
consume as little fuel as possible and expel as few greenhouse gases as 
possible.69 The use of the term indirectly is probably intentional but feels 
strange when the whole purpose of the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS 
is aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
I largely agree with the argument brought forward by the Advocate General 
and CJEU that the Aviation Directive is consistent with the territoriality 
principle due to the negative effects that emissions from aviation have on 
the EU territory. The object pursued, is of relevance to the measure taken. 
And it can be argued that the aim to stop climate change is internationally 
recognized. Facts speaking in favor of this interpretation are for example 
that 195 States have recognized the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 191 states have recognized the Kyoto 
Protocol both being soft law instruments promoting climate change 
mitigation. A parallel can also be drawn to the polluter pays principle, 
earlier described, that makes the party responsible for the pollution to bear 
the cost for the damage on the natural environment. It is debatable if the 
polluter pays principle has emerged into international customary law, but it 
is clear that the principle is a well acknowledged70 and it was for example 
used by the CJEU in Case C-188/07 Commune de Mesquer where pollution 
was caused on the Atlantic coastline of France after the sinking of the oil 
tanker Erika. 
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Regarding the possible adverse effect of the inclusion of Aviation in the EU 
ETS the Advocate General argues that there are no such effects due to the 
fact that the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS does not preclude third 
countries from bringing into effect or applying their own emissions trading 
schemes for aviation activities. In other words, the regulation does not affect 
third countries right to make decisions. Legally the argument makes sense 
and even though there is a risk of double taxation, double regulations are not 
illegal under the principles of customary international law and in certain 
fields, for example concerning direct taxation, it is even rather common. 
 
3.4 EU ETS and Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol  
 
3.4.1 Background 
 
Regarding the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol, the United Kingdom High 
Court of Justice referred the following questions to the CJEU in Case C-
366/10: 
 
• Is the Kyoto Protocol (in particular, Article 2(2))capable of being 
relied upon in this case to challenge the validity of Directive 
2003/87/EC as amended by Directive 2008/101/EC so as to include 
aviation activities within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme?71 
 
Is the Amended Directive contravening the Kyoto Protocol (in particular, 
Article 2(2)) if and insofar as it applies the Emissions Trading Scheme to 
those parts of flights (either generally or by aircraft registered in third 
countries), which take place outside the airspace of EU Member States?72 
 
3.4.2 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol 
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The Kyoto Protocol,1997 is an international treaty, which aims to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The Treaty has 192 Contracting Parties, among 
them the EU and all the EU Member States.  In Case C-366/10 one of the 
main legal arguments from the Airline industry is that EU breaches 
obligations according to the Kyoto Protocol by not working through the 
ICAO. Article 2 (2) of the Kyoto Protocol states that the Parties shall pursue 
limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases from aviation 
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  
 
3.4.3 The Opinion of the Advocate General 
The Advocate General states that the EU is undoubtedly bound by the 
Kyoto Protocol as a Party to the agreement but then argues that the Protocol 
is conditional and not enough precise to be used and that it therefore cannot 
be relied upon to challenge the validity of Directive.  
To come to this conclusion the Advocate General reviews the Kyoto 
Protocol in two stages;73 
• Is the Kyoto Protocol by its nature and broad logic capable of 
conferring rights which an individual can invoke before the courts?  
• Is the context of the Kyoto Protocol unconditional and sufficiently 
precise to enable an individual to invoke them before the courts? 
The Advocate General argues that the objective of the Protocol and its 
overall context indicates that it is a legal instrument governing only the 
relations between the States. The Advocate General states: 
The ultimate objective of the Framework Convention and all 
related legal instruments is to achieve stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. The preamble to the Framework Convention 
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states, inter alia, that the adverse effects of change in the 
Earth’s climate are a common concern of humankind, calls for 
the widest possible cooperation by all countries, and reaffirms 
the principle of sovereignty of States in international 
cooperation to address climate change.74 
It can certainly be assumed that the climate change measures 
taken by the Contracting Parties under the Kyoto Protocol will 
have a beneficial effect on individuals in the medium and long 
term, as they serve to conserve the environment. It is also 
likely that some of the measures taken will be onerous for 
individuals. However, effects such as these are only indirect. 
Neither the Framework Convention nor the Kyoto Protocol 
contains specific provisions that could directly affect the legal 
status of an individual. There are no more than a few general 
references to ‘humankind’ and ‘humans’ in these legal 
instruments.75 
Concerning the preciseness of the Protocol the Advocate General states: 
…the emission limitation and reduction commitments agreed 
in the Kyoto Protocol, although quantified, afford the 
Contracting Parties a wide discretion with regard to the 
specific policies to be implemented and measures to be taken 
in accordance with their national circumstances. All the 
commitments in the Kyoto Protocol have to be transposed into 
national law and they are not sufficiently precise to be capable 
of having a direct beneficial or adverse effect on individuals.76 
As a result hereof, the Advocate General argues that individuals cannot 
invoke Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol before the courts, with the result 
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that, in this case, the Kyoto Protocol cannot be relied upon as a benchmark 
against which the validity of Directive 2008/101 can be reviewed.77 
The Advocate General also examines Article 2 (2) and its effect on the 
inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS. The Advocate General finds that it 
would be contrary to the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol to limit measures 
to be taken at a multilateral level through ICAO. The Advocate General 
bases this on that if the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol cannot take measures 
necessary to achieve the Kyoto objectives there is a serious risk that the 
objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, to reduce greenhouse gases, might not be 
achieved.78 It has been stressed that the EU Member States for years have 
participated in various multilateral negotiations under the supervision of the 
ICAO on measures to limit and reduce greenhouse gases from aviation.79 
3.4.4 The CJEU Judgment 
 
Just as the Advocate General, the CJEU observes that the EU is a signatory 
of the Kyoto Protocol but that the content of the protocol is not sufficiently 
unconditional and precise for individuals to have the right to rely on it in 
legal proceedings in order to contest the validity of the inclusion of Aviation 
in EU ETS. The CJEU states:  
In particular, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, mentioned by 
the referring court, provides that the parties thereto are to 
pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of certain 
greenhouse gases from aviation bunker fuels, working through 
the ICAO. Thus, that provision, as regards its content, cannot 
in any event be considered to be unconditional and sufficiently 
precise so as to confer on individuals the right to rely on it in 
legal proceedings in order to contest the validity of Directive 
2008/101.80 
                                                
77 Ibid, para 87. 
78 Ibid, para 184. 
79 Ibid, para 186. 
80 Case C-366/10, para 77. 
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3.4.5 Legal Analysis and Comments 
 
The Advocate General and the CJEU dismissed the claim that emission 
from aviation can only be regulated through the ICAO based on Article 2 
(2) of the Kyoto Protocol. The basis of the dismissal was that the Kyoto 
Protocol is not “unconditional and sufficiently precise” to be invoked by the 
airline organizations. The Advocate General then brings up the question 
whiter the claim could not also be dismissed based on how Article 2 (2) is 
written. The article states that Contracting Parties "shall pursue limitation or 
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases from aviation and marine 
bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization 
and the International Maritime Organization, respectively". And here the 
Advocate General brings up a series of interesting questions, such as: can 
emissions by aviation only be controlled trough the ICAO? If it turns out to 
be impossible to find a common solution within the ICAO in the near future 
would it not go against the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol to have such a 
strict interpretation of Article 2 (2)? It would have been interesting to also 
see some of this argumentation in the decision by the CJEU.  
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4 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
In this thesis, I have looked at the legal aspects of the inclusion of Aviation 
in the EU ETS based on the ruling of the CJEU in Case C-366/10. The focus 
in the CJEU judgment is legal competence. Interpretations based on the 
underlying environmental problems are limited. Making the legal question 
mainly evolve around what can be seen as a constitutional problem. I agree 
with the CJEU when it comes to the conclusion that the inclusion of 
Aviation in the EU ETS is legitimate. However, I think it would have been 
wiser to interpret the conventions and agreements in favor for the 
environment rather than focusing on legal competence. I will further discuss 
this below. There are of course several reasons to why the CJEU chose the 
approach they did, such as historical, legal, etc. Reasons that are in 
themselves interesting themes for a master thesis, but the focus here will 
revolve around the legal interpretations and the outcome of those choices 
made by the CJEU. I want to emphasize that the interpretations and opinions 
presented are my own, and they just make out one of many different 
approaches to these questions. 
 
The reason to why I find the approach by the CJEU in parts problematic is 
that even if the CJEU should be independent, the CJEU is a product of its 
context and the legislation the Court has to interpret is highly political. As a 
result the decisions made by CJEU, especially in cases concerning States 
and individuals outside the EU, will be seen as highly political acts that will 
be fought with political measures. Something that has been clearly shown 
by the reactions from the surrounding world. By repeatedly getting into 
questions concerning competence the CJEU has to, in my view, do a hard 
job to find arguments, doctrine and case law to provide legal support for 
their conclusions. And by doing so CJEU at times get into arguments where 
alternative interpretations definitely can be discussed. For example, I feel 
hesitant to agree with the argument that the Directive concerning the 
inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS holds no concrete rules and therefore is 
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not an extraterritorial measure. Besides some, in my opinion, legally 
questionable argumentation I also see in a political, as well as on a legal 
level, the complications that come with claiming that States can escape 
agreements by working together with others. The CJEU does this claim 
when they state that the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS does not breach 
the Chicago Convention even if every Member State of the EU has signed it 
because the EU as an entity is not bound by the convention. I agree with the 
Court's interpretation, that the EU is not a part of the Chicago Convention, 
in the sense that it is one legally logical interpretation, but it is an 
interpretation that weakens an extremely important principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. I base this on the notion that for international law to be law and to 
be effective the parties bound by it must respect it. One of the greatest 
challenges in international law is the problem of making and enforcing the 
law. Something that tends to undermine both the credibility and the 
effectiveness of international legal systems. Even if I, as earlier mentioned, 
find the narrow interpretation by the CJEU to be one possible and just view, 
I do also see a possibility for the CJEU to adopt a less narrow approach. An 
approach, where the main focus is the purpose of the Convention and the 
purpose of pacta sunt servanda. All EU Member States are  parties to the 
Convention and as a result EU law that breaches the Convention results in 
the Member States not fulfilling their obligations. Therefore, in my opinion, 
any other interpretation than the opinion that the EU should follow the 
Convention, being a Party or not, undermines international law and the trust 
needed for making agreements. I think that a wider approach from the CJEU 
concerning Article 351of the TFEU and the principle of functional 
succession is needed.  
 
Politically and legislatively the EU has taken on board the strong reactions 
on the EU ETS. Even if not clearly outspoken the threats towards the EU in 
the wake of the CJEU decision has forced the EU to stop the clock and give 
the ICAO a new chance. Based on the strong opposition against the EU ETS 
it will probably be a challenge to reach a decision trough the ICAO and, in 
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my opinion, probably more so because of the choice to focus on competence 
and jurisdiction rather than environment. 
 
The question is then how a legal argument based on the need for 
environmental actions would look and why I find it more workable. I would 
like to start by mentioning a few things concerning Greenhouse gas 
emissions and global warming and the context within which the EU took the 
decision to include aviation in the EU ETS and then move over to the legal 
arguments to legitimate the inclusion of Aviation from an environmental 
approach. Greenhouse gas emissions effect the world as a whole no matter if 
the discharge is made over Sweden or over Australia and the need to 
develop and enforce multilateral governance becomes evident. The choice 
taken by the EU  when they decided to include Aviation in the EU ETS did 
not come out of nowhere. The EU had sought to reach an agreement within 
the ICAO repeatedly but failed. The greenhouse effect is a great global 
concern and the EU will be, as all nations and regions, seriously affected by 
climate change. In other words, the choice to include Aviation in the EU 
ETS can be seen as a self-protecting act by the EU.  And if the CJEU would 
have taken the environmental approach it could have been argued, for 
example, that even though the Directive that includes Aviation in the EU 
ETS has extraterritorial reach its proportional to the problem that the 
environment faces due to greenhouse gas emissions. International flights to 
and from Europe makes up a great part of the emissions discharged and 
these flights take in part place outside the jurisdiction of the EU. Based on 
proportionality, it could be claimed that it is justified to include also those 
parts of the flights as long as no other such charges exists, even though 
double charges might not be illegal, they make the directive less 
proportionate. As just mentioned the EU has tried several times to reach an 
agreement within the ICAO. As argued by the Advocate General, but not by 
the Court, if no agreement is reached within the framework of the ICAO 
within a reasonable time the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol must be at liberty 
to take the measures necessary to achieve the Kyoto objectives. By doing 
this the EU could fulfill the Member States obligations to third parties and 
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still defend the legality of the act. It would almost certainly also result in 
criticism, but the protection of the environment would probably have 
invoked less emotion on a State level. For now, several questions still stand: 
If a decision is not made within the ICAO or if agreements met will be less 
progressive than expected from the EU what action will be taken then? Both 
politically and legally there are many battles to be fought. A dispute over 
the Chicago Convention, for example, could go through the Council of 
ICAO. And what if ICAO comes to another conclusion than the CJEU? 
After all, based on the Moscow Declaration, a large part of the world, or at 
least its leaders, seem to disagree with the decision of the CJEU. On the 
other hand the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS has put the issue of 
greenhouse gas emissions and aviation on the agenda and maybe by doing 
so the EU has made ICAO realize the need to take action. One thing is clear; 
the dispute over emissions from the airline industry remains to be seen.  
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